

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

ENIO HUMBERTO ARGUETA,)
Plaintiff,)
v.) CV 624-029
SMITH STATE PRISON, et al.,)
Defendants.)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Hancock State Prison in Sparta, Georgia, filed this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concerning events alleged to have taken place at Smith State Prison (“SSP”) in Glennville, Georgia. He is proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis* (“IFP”). Because he is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff’s complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (*per curiam*); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (*per curiam*).

I. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

A. BACKGROUND

In his complaint, Plaintiff named as Defendants: (1) John Doe I, (2) John Doe II, (3) John Doe III, and (4) Smith State Prison. (Doc. no. 1, p. 2.) Taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows. During the early morning hours of March 28, 2023, Defendants John Does I-III opened Plaintiff’s cell door allowing 7 to 8 inmates to enter. (Id. at 2-3.) The inmates stabbed Plaintiff, causing life-

threatening injuries. (*Id.* at 3.) Plaintiff was airlifted to a hospital where he remained in a coma for two days. (*Id.*) For relief, Plaintiff seeks various forms of equitable relief and compensatory damages. (*Id.* at 3-4.)

B. DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard for Screening

The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (*per curiam*) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” or if it “tenders ‘naked

assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Finally, the Court affords a liberal construction to a *pro se* litigant’s pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (*per curiam*); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (*per curiam*). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the Court has a duty to re-write the complaint. *Snow v. DirecTV, Inc.*, 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).

2. Plaintiff Inadequately Identifies Defendants John Does I-III

Plaintiff alleges three “state prison correctional officers” unlawfully opened his cell door permitting other inmates to enter and attack him. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 3-4.) Generally, “fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” *Richardson v. Johnson*, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). An exception exists, “when the plaintiff’s description of the defendant is so specific as to be ‘at the very worst, surplusage,’” *Id.* (quoting *Dean v. Barber*, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1992)). In *Richardson*, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found merely describing a John Doe defendant as a correctional officer “was insufficient to identify the defendant among the many guards employed [at the facility.]” *Id.* Here, Plaintiff has provided insufficient information to identify Defendants. At most, these three Defendants were “state prison correctional officers” working at SSP on March 28, 2023. (See generally doc. no. 1.) Thus, the Court must recommend dismissal of Defendants John Does I-III.

3. SSP is Not a Proper Party in § 1983 Claims


Plaintiff fails to state a claim against SSP because prisons are not legal entities subject to liability in § 1983 claims. See *Jamelson v. Unnamed Defendant*, No. CV 617-103, 2017 WL

6503630, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2017) (holding “Georgia State Prison . . . is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued”), *adopted by* 2018 WL 616142 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2018); Parks v. Georgia, No. CV 517-047, 2017 WL 2930832, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 10, 2017) (holding “penal institutions . . . are generally not considered legal entities subject to suit”); see also Brannon v. Thomas Cnty. Jail, 280 F. App’x. 930, 934 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting Thomas County Jail is not an entity capable of being sued under Georgia law). Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 included “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (subjecting only “persons” to liability); Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against SSP should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** Plaintiff’s complaint be **DISMISSED** for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that this civil action be **CLOSED**.

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 2024, at Augusta, Georgia.



BRIAN K. EPPS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA